Modeling Climate Change *Uncertainty with imprecise probabilities*

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Thanks

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Outline

- Classical intertemporal risk analysis
- Ignorance, uncertainty and imprecise probabilities
- (Futures studies and global warming 2100)

Questions: anytime

Risk vs. uncertainty

Classical since Knight (1921), Keynes...

- Risk: well founded probabilities
- No probabilities: Ambiguity, Deep/epistemic/hard uncertainty

1. Classical intertemporal risk analysis.

Classical risk analysis

- 1.1 Expected utility
- 1.2 Stochastic dynamic programming
- 1.3 Modeling the climate risk

1.1 Where to park the ice-cream truck?

• Expected profit $\Pi(a, s)$ is:

	Location a				
Weather s		lpha	eta	γ	δ
Hot	\mathbf{H}	10	6	11	8
Cold	\mathbf{C}	2	4	0	3

Classwork

Assume p(H) = p(C) = 0.5consider the isoelastic utility function:

$$U(\Pi) = \frac{\Pi^{1-r}}{1-r}$$

1/ Which optimal choice corresponds to r = 0? 2/ Predict intuitively which optimal choice corresponds to r = -1 and r = 1.5. 3/ Give a value for r such that the optimal choice is δ .

1.2 Expected value of information

- In the sequel I assume $U(\Pi) = \Pi$
- *E* denotes the expected value with respect to probability p

$$E\Pi(a,s) = p(H)\Pi(a,H) + p(C)\Pi(a,C)$$

What is the Expected profit?

Classwork

What is the expected profit if the decision maker has an enveloppe containing a perfect prediction about *s* ?

		Location a			
Weather s		lpha	eta	γ	δ
Hot	Η	10	6	11	8
Cold	\mathbf{C}	2	4	0	3

What is the Expected Value of Perfect Information (EVPI)?

Value of future information (EVFI)

For climatic change, EVPI is irrelevant, we must use the value of *future* information.

Closing options todays destroys EVFI.


1.3 Modeling the climate risk

Message: Nonlinearity in climate impact significantly adds to the risk.


Reviewing an integrated climate model:

$$\max_{a} E\Pi(a,s) = -\sum_{2000}^{2200} \frac{C(a) + D(a,s)}{(1+d)^{t-t_0}}$$

The nonlinear function $t(\Delta T, s)$



Where are the tresholds ?



Steps of the analysis

Cf. Nordhaus (1994) Managing the global commons

- Central case
- Sensitivity analysis
- Scenarios
- Dynamic programming

Comparing damage curves shapes


Assuming a $\Delta T = f(a)$ climate module. I compare a linear, power and treshold stochastic damage functions:

$$D(a,s) = \tilde{s}\Delta T$$


$$D(a,s) = b\Delta T^{\tilde{s}}$$

$$D(a,s) = b\Delta T + t(\Delta T, \tilde{s})$$

Expected damages are comparable



Optimal strategies



Conclusion

Expected utility + dynamic programming \rightarrow precaution but where do the probabilities come from?

Discussion on part 1.

2. Ignorance and uncertainty.

Levels of ignorance

Simplified from Smithson (1988) Ignorance and uncertainty

- Risk
- Uncertainty (+ Ambiguity)
- Error (+ Surprises, Unk. Unk.)
- Ignorance (+ Taboo, active ignorance)

Outline

Ignorance and uncertainty

- Constraint-based methods
- Imprecise probabilities
- Communicating the impacts uncertainty


2.1 Constraint based methods

Action *a* is acceptable if and only if:

the trajectory it leads to lies within acceptability constraints.

Example: CO₂ emissions contrained by a 550 ppmv ceiling

Viable C emissions profiles



Take-home on viability

- Familly of acceptable actions
- Not any arbitrary curve inside the enveloppe is acceptable
- The upper enveloppe is not acceptable

2.2 At which gate to park the food truck?

• Expected profit Π is:

		L	-002	ation	δ	
Winning team		lpha	eta	γ	δ	
Home	\mathbf{H}	10	6	11	8	
Visitors	\mathbf{V}	2	4	0	3	

Home team won 5, lost 2 in last 9 matches, NO TIES

Imprecise Dirichlet Model

Information: Home team won 5, lost 2 out of —including the next unknown— 10 matches:

(1)
$$\frac{5}{10} \le p(\mathbf{H}) \le 1 - \frac{2}{10}$$

C= [0.5, 0.8] is called a credal set

Precautionary comparison (Walley 1991)

Location α is preferred to location β because

The expected profit is larger in α than in β for all credible probabilities:

 $\alpha \succ \beta \stackrel{def}{\Leftrightarrow} \text{ for all } p \in \mathcal{C}, \ \mathsf{E}_p(\Pi(\alpha, s)) > \mathsf{E}_p(\Pi(\beta, s))$

Classwork

Compare α with δ . Compare α with γ .

(2)

		Location				
Winning team		lpha	eta	γ	δ	
Home	Η	10	6	11	8	
Visitors	\mathbf{V}	2	4	0	3	
$0.5 \le p(\mathbf{H}) \le 0.8$						

A partial ordering

$$\alpha \succ \beta$$
, $\gamma \succ \beta$, $\delta \succ \beta$, $\alpha \succ \delta$

There is a familly of maximal actions, but not all actions can be compared.

Classwork

Would the driver be ready to pay 5 for the location α ? What is its maximum willingness to pay for α ? If the driver had a firm reservation for α , would he be ready to give it up for 9? What is its minimum willingness to accept?

3.3 Uncertainty about climate impacts

- So far a linear probability scale
- Imprecise probability suggests a 2 dimensional possibility/necessity vocabulary
- And a vocabulary about experts agreement

Conclusion on Part 2

- Non Expected Utility lead to more than one 'best policy'
- Another form of precaution
- Dynamic programing: on the research agenda

Discussion on part 2.

Reception

Adriatico Guesthouse Bar

Wednesday, October 1st, 20.00 hour

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3. Assessing Global Warming 2100

Outline

Assessing climate change impacts

- Uncertainty and futures studies
- **J** Upper probabilities on ΔT_{2100}
- Scenarios

3.1 SRES controversy

Schneider (2002) Can we estimate the likelihood of climatic change in 2100?

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change emissions scenarios have no probabilities.

The upper bound is +5.8 degree C in 2100.

The usual problematic gap

A recurring controversy of Futures research:

- Forecasts have probabilities
- Scenarios do not have a quantitative likelihood

Use upper probability as possibility!

$p\in [0,\overline{p}]$

- Necessity (lower probability) is 0
- Possibility \overline{p} can be < 1 for irrealistic futures</p>
- Use imprecise probabilities for decision making
- Use Shackle (1952) Logic of surprise combination rules

3.2 Assessing \overline{p} (global warming 2100)


Rationally subjective, based on published literature.

Warming 2100 = CO₂ concentration excess $\times \frac{1}{3}$ climate sensitivity


Summarizing model results on [CO₂]

- M: Atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration in 2100
- Source: All 56 'no-intervention' records in SRES database*
- The possibility of M is proportional to the number of models predicting concentration 5% close to M
- * Made publicly available thanks to Tsuneyuki Morita, Social & Environmental Systems Division, National Institute for Environmental Studies, Tsukuba Japan

Histogram of available results



Possibility of CO $_2$ concentration in 2100




Experts judgment on climate sensitivity

- $\Delta T(2 \times CO_2)$: Equilibrium global warming for a doubling of pre-industrial CO₂ concentration
- 16 experts elicitation survey by Keith-Morgan

- 1. Transform elicited probabilities into possibility
- 2. Discount experts pretending to know better (standard deviation lower than peer average/2).
- 3. Fusion without the independence assumption (hyper-cautious conjunction)

Subjective assessment of $\Delta T(2 \times CO_2)$




Combining rules


Assuming no interaction,

- Conjunction: The joint possibility of $([CO_2], \Delta T(2 \times CO_2))$ is the minimum of the possibilities of each component.
- Disjunction: The possibility of ' A OR B ' is the maximum of the possibilities of each component.


The joint possibility distribution



The possibility of 2.4° C warming




Global warming 2100 possibility




3.3 Picking focal futures

Remember the credal set interpretation




Properties of the focal futures


- Include the most likely
- None is preferred
- Widely contrasted



Results: Global warming futures



Relation with IPCC scenarios



Possibility of IPCC scenarios

	π	[CO ₂] ppmv	Climate Sensitivity °C/ _{2×CO2}	Global Warming °C
A1b	1	720	2.7	2.4
A2	0.36	840	3.9	4.0
B2	0.36	620	1.4	1.1
B1	0.18	560	3.0	2.0

General discussion